Introduction
Imagine you have a clever idea for a product and use it to start the business of your dreams. You open your doors, work day and night, and turn that idea into a hugely successful business with employees and customers. But then you get a letter from a patent "troll."
2 The troll's timing is deliberate -now that your product is fully developed and in the market, it's too late for you to change it. You have no choice but to pay the troll or endure a lengthy lawsuit.
This story, adapted from a radio ad campaign profiled by NPR, explains the idea of patent hold-up -the practice of demanding patent royalties from a company when the company is most vulnerable -after it has implemented a technology. The resulting settlement is driven largely by the timing of the demand, rather than its merits. 3 The patent holder "holds up" the seller, prompting a settlement.
Widely theorized and debated in academic and policy circles, 4 the concept of patent hold-up has gained recent prominence by predicting the current patent "crisis," including the smartphone wars between Apple, Samsung, and others, 5 abuse of standards essential patents, and the rise of patent "trolls"
6 -all through ex-post assertions of technology patents. Hold-up has drawn intense attention to the patent system, and not the good kind. Nobel-prize winner Gary Becker has blamed a "defective patent system [that] creates opportunities for hold ups and excessive litigation." 7 Federal Reserve economists Boldrin and Levine have called for the elimination of the patent system on the basis of "a gigantic hold-up problem."
8 President Obama has lamented what he sees as not just patent "hold-up," but "hold-em-up": when patent holders "hijack somebody else's idea and see if they can extort some money out of them." 9 2 Laura Sydell, "Taking The Battle Against Patent Trolls To The Public" NPR All Things Considered, August 30, 2013. 3 See infra Part 2. 4 See infra Part 2. 5 For a description of these wars and an examination of the patents involved in them, see Stuart Graham & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Of Smart Phone Wars and Software Patents, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, vol. 27, no. 1, 67 (Winter 2013) . 6 A term that refers to entities that do not make products and are focused on the assertion of patents as their primary business model. Also more politely described as "patent assertion entities." See Colleen V. But while embraced by policymakers, public thinkers, and academics 10 patent hold-up theory, I argue in this essay, is wrong, or at least incomplete. Policymakers are moving to curb litigation abuses: the White House has issued five executive actions and seven legislative recommendations to curb "frivolous litigation;" 11 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice are investigating patent trolls, 12 and abuses involving hold up using standards essential patents; Congress is holding hearings and introducing bills specifically targeted at these developments. 13 As they do, I argue, public understanding of the patent enforcement dynamic must be calibrated to include not only patent hold-up but what I call patent hold-out: the practice of companies routinely ignoring patents and resisting patent owner demands, because the odds of getting caught are small.
Patent hold-out is widespread, for both legal and practical reasons. While the hold-up story is sympathetic to defendants, the hold-out story tells the plaintiffs' side. Reconsider the story from before, but now put yourself in the patentee's shoes, and imagine that the company selling the product is a large, not small, company. As an inventor you had the idea first and wanted to start a business on it. You tried, without luck, to get the product commercialized successfully, though you did get a patent. You find the technology being deployed by a large company and approach it to sign a license. The company ignores you and refuses to engage or license the patent, no matter how strong it is or reasonable your offer.
14 The large company is "holding-out" on your patent demand.
Considering patent hold-up and patent hold-out narratives together, rather than either narrative alone, I argue in this essay, provides a more robust account of the patent enforcement dynamic. It also explains some of the shortcomings of patent holdup theory.
For example, to reduce patent hold-up, advocates have recommended reforming patent remedies and reducing the number of problematic patents. Over the past years 10 Including myself, as described infra at Part ____. Hold-out theory explains why some of these developments have happened, despite the enactment of many of the cures that hold-up theory has advocated. That patentees have been "held-out" on explains why they are increasingly partnering with patent assertion entities (PAEs) or "trolls. 24 Juror sympathy to patentholders whose claims are ignored can explain large damages award.
A combined view reveals that the answer is not to submit wholesale to either account but to recognize the problems with the patent system that give rise to both. The high costs of litigating patents leads to hold-up, as small companies can't afford to defend their use, as well as hold-out, as small inventors can't afford to bring their suits and turn instead to trolls.
Embracing hold-up and hold-out narratives together reveals surprising pathways to a better patent system -focused as much on the procedure, design, and institutional constraints, as on doctrinal levers to effect change. These include 1) early dispositive rulings, 2) coordination across courts and agencies, and 3) alternatives to expert-driven damages determination. Rather than trying to eliminate all component technology patents, or to enforce all of them, the patent system should focus on reducing the transactions costs that feed both hold-up and hold-out.
Part I reviews hold-up theory and how it has fared in practice. Part II develops hold-out theory and explains how it fills in the gaps that hold-up theory has left. Part III discusses critiques of each view and asks which is more compelling. Part IV discusses the implications and recommendations that follow from a combined view. Part V concludes.
PART I: HOLD-UP
What do patent trolls and the smartphone and standards wars have in common? All have captured national attention, and all have been blamed on patent "hold-up." What is hold-up? 25 It is when a "gap between economic commitments and subsequent commercial negotiations enables one party to capture part of the fruits of another's investment." 26 In the patent context, when a patent is asserted after a product is made, the patentee has the upper hand, not due to the economic value of the technology, but the high cost of changing the product to avoid the implicated technology. 
The Contexts of Patent Hold-Up

Early Examples
Complaints about hold-up type abuse date back to the early days of the patent system. A case from 1835 involved a patent over using coal in a forge. The patent was issued without any examination, a byproduct of a registration-based patent system 27 blamed for generating many frivolous or useless patents. 28 As a patent "speculator," the patentee did not practice the patent on his own but instead demanded payment from blacksmiths under the simple logic that: "it will be worthwhile for every blacksmith to give me a couple of dollars for a right rather than contest it with me." 29 Around that time, a petition signed by Pennslyvanians protested the patent system as being "liable to great abuse, and in itself [being] unjust and oppressive." 30 Their main concern was a too-readily granted injunction, the fear of which drove defendants to pay for patent rights rather than "suffer the injury of stopping their means of livelihood."
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The common behavior complained about was the assertion of patents on a product after it had already been made, and leveraging the fear of an injunction or lawsuit, rather than the merits of the technology, to wrest a settlement. In other words, patent hold-up.
Standards Hold-Up 170 years or so later, thinking about hold-up has been advanced primarily in the context of standards by prominent law and economics scholars and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 32 To promote consistency and interoperability across products, industry participants now agree to promulgate a standardized protocol of deploying a technology like connecting to the internet. In return, holders of patents needed to practice the standard protocol agree to make their patents available on free or "reasonable and non-discriminatory" (RAND) terms. 31 Id. at 941. 32 See, e.g. the references cited herein, and infra note ___. For criticisms of hold-up theory, see, e.g. cites to Brooks, Geradin, Kieff, Spulber, and others infra Part II. 33 See, e.g. ANSI Essential Requirements § 3.1. A kind of super hold-up occurs when a patent holder manages to get its patent into the standards protocol without making a licensing commitment, or, despite their commitment, seeks an injunction. If a patent is truly "essential," 34 its use cannot be avoided without sacrificing compliance with the standard. A wireless device that suddenly can't connect to the internet isn't worth much. The particular practice of patentholders suddenly emerging with their demands, after the standard has been promulgated, has been called patent ambush. 35 The number of patents implicated by standards can easily number in the thousands, 36 multiplying the risk.
What's Wrong with the Patent System, According to Patent Hold-Up Theory
Across these contexts, then, three key ingredients of patent hold-up have consistently been identified: opportunistic "ex post" assertion, marginal patents, and remedies that disproportionately award the patentee. Each has been a target of patent reform efforts.
Ex Post Assertions
Whether in the form of patent "ambush," or patent trolling, the problem with patent hold-up is the timing of assertions. In most cases it's much more expensive to change an existing product than to change a product concept still in the design phase. The incentive to settle is driven by the desire to avoid these additional costs, rather just than the inherent value of the technology. Accordingly, patent-holders hat rich incentives to bring their claims after a product has been developed and successfully marketed.
Bad Patents
According to its detractors, hold-up is also made possible by marginal patents.
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If a product or standard incorporates thousands of patents, there's a greater chance the single asserted patent is old or obvious. Complaints that software patents are "junk" are rife. Calls for reforming marginal patents range from the polite to the adamant: 1) make them better, 38 2) invalidate them, 39 3) abolish them, 40 the extra scrutiny that have been applied to business method patent applications through the second pair of eyes review). 39 E.g. once they have issued, through various post-grant review options, described infra at note ___
Disproportionate Remedies
Another source of hold-up are remedies that are out of proportion with the "crime" of component infringement. 42 Patents confer the right to exclude, but if a patent covers only a small part of a big product, should the entire product be enjoined? No, in that case, 43 or when redesign would be really expensive, say advocates. 44 Outsized damages -that award a large percentage of revenue based on a small patent -are also to blame. When multiple royalties are sought, the result can be a total royalty rate that exceeds the entire revenue associated with the product, a phenomenon known as royalty stacking. 45 
The Uptake of Patent Hold-Up Cautions and Cures
Concerns about patent hold-up have been hugely influential among policy audiences, including the judiciary. When the Supreme Court decided its landmark eBay v. MercExchange decision, Justice Kennedy specifically cited in his concurrence "injunction[s]...employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees," by firms that use patents "not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees." 46 The decision made it harder to get injunctions, reducing the odds of getting one from about 95% to about 75%, and much less, when requested by a troll. 47 The Federal Circuit has further limited injunctive relief in component patent cases 48 through a strand of cases. And the district courts have been reluctant to enjoin products or award inflated royalties based on the assertion of standards essential patents. 49 The Federal Circuit, under the leadership of Chief Judge Randall Rader, has also changed damages laws. It is no longer appropriate for a court to assign a single patent, which may represent just one of thousands of patents, a quarter of the value of the product without some scientifically justified basis for doing so. 50 When royalty rates are calculated based on looking at the royalty rates in like circumstances, they really must be like circumstances.
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Awards must be based on reality.
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Finally, policymakers have taken on the "bad patents" that fuel hold-up, according to its proponents. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has put greater scrutiny on patent applications over certain types of inventions at the examination stage. 53 Congress has made it easier to challenge a patent's validity once it has issued from the Patent Office. ' The America Invents Act, created "inter partes review", which "allows patents to be challenged on several grounds of validity, without the deference to the patent that applies in courts. 54 Business method patents are subject to more searching review. 
What's Happened -Patent Hold-Up Has Apparently Gotten Worse
With all of these developments, patent hold-up should be on the wane. But holdup is arguably worse, not better. Seven years after eBay, an industry has developed around the types of companies about which Justice Kennedy expressed concern. Patent "trolls," according to public perception, wait until the technology has been developed and commercialized in order to get the greatest royalties based on their assertions. 56 There are more than 15 publicly traded companies whose business model is primarily the assertion of patents. 57 As the Office of the President's 2013 white paper reported, PAEs have brought an increasing number and share of patent suits, 62% of all suits in 2012, others have pegged the share of patent monetizer suits at closer to 58% Likewise, despite evolution of the damages caselaw, it is not clear that damages awards are going down and indeed, juries continue to make record awards.
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Some of this is due to the time it will take for district courts to operationalize the higher standards of damages proof recently imposed by the Federal Circuit. But it may also be that, as described in the next section, policy discussions of "hold-up" and apportionment are falling on deaf (jury) ears.
Finally, the smartphone wars -between companies like Apple, Samsung, HTC and many others -have further bloodied the waters. The number of smartphone suits has quadrupled, to 103 since eBay was decided.
61 Products have been banned as a result. Thus, at bottom, hold-up theory has described and perhaps even predicted an important set of problems. But it has faltered in providing solutions to them. What is hold-up theory missing? The paradoxical answer, I believe, is, the other side of the story -patent hold-out.
PART II: HOLD-OUT
While policymakers and academics have embraced the concept of patent holdup, the patent system is administered by judges and juries. Their litigants tell a different story:
"I could not commercialize my invention alone, but the financial institutions I needed to partner with largely ignored me when I approached them with my invention. They were able to adopt my invention without me, and ignore my protests, because they knew I lacked the resources to take them to court and stop them." Each of these phenomena -the practice of companies ignoring high-tech patents, the high costs of detection and enforcement, in some cases, relative to the value of the invention, and the underenforcement of patents -has been observed and documented, but in isolation. Together, they create a cohesive theory of patent hold-out that provides an alternative explanation for the dysfunctions of the patent system. 
The Contexts of
Early Examples
While undertheorized, patent hold-out and the challenges associated with enforcing patents have generated policy concern for decades. When introducing his agenda for patent reform in the 1960s, President Lyndon B. Johnson cited the fact that, "the inventor is often faced with time consuming, costly and unnecessary legal action to enforce his rights" 66 as a key motivation. In 1990, the ABA passed a resolution favoring the creation of low-cost, small claims patent and copyright enforcement proceedings: 67 This move was motivated by the perception that increases in the cost of litigation "effectively shut out [claimants] from the federal courts." 68 
Reverse Patent Hold-Up
Within the patent standards context, patentholders have also worried about receiving less than they deserve. While hold-up worries about patentholders wielding undue leverage, hold-out is concerned with the opposite -that implementers (most often manufacturers) wield undue leverage, allowing them to use standards-essential patents and not pay for them. For example the manufacturer may argue that they don't need a license because the patent is invalid or non-infringed because it is not truly essential. 69 Or they may use the technology without paying "under the guise that the patent owner's offers to license were not fair or reasonable. The patent owner is therefore forced to defend its rights through expensive litigation." 70 Manufacturers who behave this way are accused of engaging in "reverse hold-up," a species of patent holdout. 71 patentee, 72 less likely to overturn the patent office's decision to grant a patent, 73 and more likely to award greater damages. 74 Among patentee groups, the fewer the inventors, the more likely a patentee is to win. 75 This apparent pro-plaintiff bias extends to concerns about patent hold-out. In mock experiments, jurors have been known to "fret that the patentee has had to wait years to recover its damages, and they often ratchet the damages award upward to compensate." 76 Mark Lemley has noted that courts do this too, in effect adding prohibited multipliers or "kickers" to damages awards because of a sense of "perceived unfairness" in the law's approach to calculating damages. 77 Despite instructions that tell jurors that they should award damages in order to compensate, not punish, jurors at times instinctively punish hold-out behavior. In the words of one mock juror: "[the defendant] had the option to license the patent and didn't, so now we are in punitive damages... and they have to feel the wrath." 78 Because the manufacturer "held-out" during the negotiation phase, the patentee was forced to assert the patent later, and it's the manufacturer's bad luck that it made the wrong choice and implemented the invention anyway.
What's Wrong with the Patent System According to Patent Hold-Out Theory
The common complaints among these diverse accounts include the high costs of enforcement, risks that patentees have to endure to enforce their patents, and shirking by infringers. Each of these provides an alternative explanation to patent hold-up concerning what is wrong with the patent system.
Ex Ante Shirking (Not Ex Post Assertions)
The problem with hold-up assertions, according to patent hold-up theory, is that they take place ex post, after the product has already been commercialized and irreversible investments made. Indeed, that is the typical "troll" story, of a patentholder lying in wait, and launching surprise attack when a company tries to implement a patent. But patent hold-out theory explains the timing of these demands -that patent holders need to resort to ex post assertions because manufacturers ignore ex ante demands, and, in many cases don't take steps to clear products prior to their release even though they are arguably in the best position to determine whether any patents read on their plans, since they know what they are or aren't doing. 79 The "troll" isn't lying in wait, but rather languishing, having asked repeatedly for help, and repeatedly been rebuffed.
The phenomenon of companies ignoring high-tech patents is welldocumented. 80 From a potential defendant's perspective, the concerns are practicalreading the patents of others can increases the risk of an enhanced damage award.
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Companies also often counseled not to engage or accept unsolicited offers to license or buy patents, 82 knowing that engaging with the patent holder can often result in legal or settlement costs. 83 Since only 1-2% of patents is actually litigated, 84 it's better to take your chances.
From the patentee's perspective, though, when companies resist patent demands, they shirk their responsibilities. In accordance with one inventor's account: "I did not have the means to approach and negotiate with these large companies who were more sophisticated, had more money, and would simply look to delay everything 79 I am thankful to Michael Risch for making this point to me. . 4, 2013) . 84 Chien, Predicting supra note ___ at ___. through drawn out litigations." 85 From this perspective, the relative size of the infringer as compared to the patentee, not the merits of the claim, dictate the outcome -that companies, especially big companies, hold-out.
Risky (Not Bad) Patents
Hold-out theory also finds fault, not with patents themselves, but with the risks that are required to enforce them. When a patent is asserted, there's a risk it will be challenged and ultimately invalidated. A court can knock out a patent on a variety of bases-that the invention doesn't cover protectable subject matter, the patent doesn't enable, doesn't adequately describe, etc. 86 Even if the patent is valid, the patent may not be infringed -if the terms aren't interpreted "just so," the contested behavior won't be covered. 87 The patentee can survive the battle and still lose the war. A patentee may spend millions of dollars enforcing patent only to have it invalidated by the PTO. 88 Large jury verdicts are often reduced, 89 and what the claim terms mean overturned against plaintiffs about a third of the time, and even more often with high-technology patents. 90 Even after a license agreement is secured, patents can be challenged over and over again. 91 It is for all of these reason, some argue, that patentees need big wins, to make up for the failures. 92 Indeed, patents are perceived as risky assets, 93 heavily discounted in debt transactions. 
Disproportionate Litigation Costs (Not Disproportionate Remedies)
According to patent hold-up theory, what fuels patent abuses are outsized remedies. But patent hold-out finds fault in the high costs of litigation, relative to the value of the case -that is, it costs more to bring a suit than the suit is worth. The problem is, in other words, disproportionate litigation costs, not disproportionate remedies.
Disproportionate costs are particularly problematic for low-value disputes. According to the 2011 AIPLA Annual Economic Survey, when less than $1 million is at risk, it costs $916,000, on average, to litigate it through trial. 95 Litigation becomes even more unaffordable when both sides' costs are factored in. This is less likely to be the case when more than $25 million are at risk, where the average cost of $6 million per party is a fraction of the reward. As with most things, the truth between these diametrically opposing views lies somewhere in between. In this Part, I explore the counterarguments and available evidence behind each theory to determine which narrative is right. I find that the rapidly emerging state of patent hold-up -as expressed through the smartphone and standards wars and the growth of patent trolls -and the impacts on innovation in the form of disrupted innovation present the most urgent concern. But I find that hold-up theory also has deficiencies that patent hold-out can address, explaining why hold-up cures haven't worked and the dynamics that reforms that need to take into account in order to be successful.
Critiquing Patent Hold-Out
a. Patent Non-Enforcement Is Good for Consumers and Competition
Although the hold-out story is compelling on a personal level, the social calculus must also include transaction and information costs. According to some, the underenforcement of patents is actually good thing to a point, because it "shelters" follow-on innovation from the costs of licensing and risks of liability. 98 Although this view may seem shortsighted, sustained innovation in information technology, despite the norm of patent acquisition and non-enforcement, 99 belies such a characterization.
Making the converse point, patent enforcement has been accused of undercutting the "permissionless innovation," 100 credited with fueling internet-based economic growth. 101 In addition, the hold-out story assumes that inventors should get the full benefit of their inventions -a reasonable conclusion to draw from the statutory right to exclude 102 that the statute promises. But such a result could be disastrous socially. Consumers and other producers should, and also do share in the benefits -according to one estimate, innovators capture, on average, only 2.2% of the total value of their innovations, other producers and consumers enjoy the rest. 103 The focus shouldn't be on trying to increase the returns to patentees to 100%, but on optimizing the total social return.
Still, it's hard to know where the right balance should be. The hold-out story is consistent with the theories of thinkers like David Teece that a lack of complimentary assets makes it harder for innovators to appropriate the value of their technologies, 104 and the Schumpeterian view that perfect competition provides inadequate incentives to innovate. 105 However, given how incremental advances are in high-tech, it is also suspected that many patented innovations would have happened anyway, regardless of the patent.
b. If Patent Hold-Out is the Problem, Patent Assertion Entities Aren't a Good Solution
In light of current policy debates, then, the more important question may be, not should we be worried about hold-out, but, does the current model of patent assertion do a good job of rewarding and incenting innovation? On this score the available empirical evidence is not encouraging: the transactions costs associated with PAE assertions appear, in some cases, to dwarf the return to the inventors. 106 Many PAE assertions focus on the "wrong" target -small companies 107 and end users 108 that appear to have been named in order to generate nuisance-fee settlements. In the case of user suits, the party that can most efficiently resolve the dispute, the supplier, has often been left off. 109 The returns generated from such campaigns, then, don't reflect the economic value of the patent, but the avoidance of legal costs -which comprise pure rentseeking.
In addition, the economics of patent assertion create their own distortions. The economies of scale that make patent assertion worthwhile require patent assertion entities to be very selective, choosing carefully a few patents to assert over and over. 110 This approach, while practical, necessarily shuts out many patents and patentees. That might be a good thing, filtering out many low-value patents, but it doesn't provide a complete solution to hold-out-as PAEs can't vindicate the rights of every deserving patentholder. In addition, the patents that are the most valuable from an assertion perspective -old, broadly worded, detectably infringed, and understandable by a juryaren't necessarily the ones that have contributed the most to the field.
For patent assertion to better address the problem of patent hold-out, then, it should cost less, return more to inventors, focus on the right targets, and reward true technical contribution -for example where there is actual theft, high patent quality, or industry recognition -rather than patent contribution.
Critiquing Patent Hold-Up a. Not All Hold-Up is Created Equal
Nor does hold-up theory get everything right. By casting the mere legal act of patent enforcement in pejorative terms, "hold-up" causes suppliers to dig in, refuse to pay, and spend money resisting meritorious assertions. To the extent that hold up theory encourages a misimpression that all patents are bad it feeds the inefficiencies that flow from company refusals to pay.
In addition, critics have said that hold-up doesn't really exist because the reputational costs and repeat player nature of interactions between patentees and infringers encourage patentees to "play nice." 111 They prefer private ordering arrangements, for example standards rules and patent pools, 112 to government solutions.
These criticisms have their greatest force when applied to conflicts between repeat players who have symmetric stakes and participate in private ordering activities, for example standards-setting. 113 Indeed, those who have looked for evidence that holdup has actually occurred in this context have found a lack of empirical evidence. 114 But these reassurances are much less persuasive when applied to certain types of patent "trolls." An entity formed solely to assert a single patent portfolio 115 is by definition not a repeat player, 116 and does not have a market reputation to defend. It can't sign licensing commitments in exchange for being part of a standard when it only acquires the patents long after the standard has been formed. The measurable harm to innovation -in the form of delayed hiring, business pivots, and the killing of products and product lines -has also been documented. 117 History also belies the assertion that private ordering can provide a complete solution to patent trolling -during the two historical eras of trolling most similar to the present, Congressional, PTO, and court leadership were key to restoring patent equilibrium. 118 In addition, the enforcement "norm" typically associated with "trolls" is increasingly being engaged in by operating companies. There has been a proliferation of litigation involving standards-essential patents, 119 and filing of SEP cases at the ITC, 120 an act seen as largely inconsistent with the commitments to license. This development has proven so troubling that the DOJ, FTC, and President have weighed in to stop it. 121 Based on a survey I did among over 100 companies, 44% said that they had monetized or were thinking about monetizing their patents. Finally, hold-out theory exposes the weaknesses of hold-up "cures," and why despite apparent progress, fights involving patent hold-ups have become more, not less frequent . Hold-up theory has largely been concerned with large defendants and the use of high switching costs to gain leverage. The focus on remedies follows from this concern. However, hold-up theory has, in doing so, ignored small defendants, and the reality that for them, it is the cost of defense, 123 not the ultimate remedy, that creates undue leverage. If it costs close to a million dollars to defend a case, 124 even if there is no threat of injunction or damages about a certain amount, it will always cheaper to settle.
The appeal of hold-out to judges and jurors also explains why courts may resist the changes to damages methodologies motivated by hold-up concerns. Jurors' "willingness to disregard the boundaries of law and evidence" 125 to arrive also the outcome they believe to be fair, suggest that changing the law alone will not be the answer to reducing hold-up. The answer is, in part, to better educate jurors on the role of the patent system within the broader social context and about the impacts of litigation and remedies on defendants, in particular small defendants, as well as to better police the evidence jurors are allowed to see. Injunctions liability for component inventions should be clarified and communicated, so that courts have appropriate guidance when given the "nuclear option" of an injunction.
PART IV: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
Combining 'hold-out" and "hold-up" perspectives reveals surprising pathways to a better patent system -focused on the design, rather than the doctrine of patent law. Rather than trying to eliminate all technology patents, or to enforce all of them, we should enable challenges to their validity to happen early and inexpensively and price them appropriately and more importantly, in a way that laypeople can determine, in proportion to their value. Instead of trying to get patent law perfect, we should make it cheaper, more streamlined, and more equitable.
This part considers four of the more promising ways of doing so: 1) reducing duplication by improving coordination between the venues; getting the patentee and accused on the same page as early as possible through 2) early adjudication of dispositive issues, including patent validity and 3) early damages disclosure and nonexpert damages methodologies, 4) promoting proportionality between the economic value of a patent and the cost of fighting about it, including by penalizing hold-up and hold-out, through fee-shifting.
Reduce Duplication, Improve Coordination 126 After a patent has issued, its validity can be contested in three different venuesthe PTO, the district court, and the International Trade Commission, also known as the "unholy trifecta" of patent law. 127 The ITC and district court apply different standards for making this determination than does the PTO (which has, within the PTO, four different ways to do so), 128 and all three venues offer different procedures.
A patent can be enforced in both the district court and the ITC, but the remedies and procedures available to the parties are different. While district court decisions bind the ITC, the inverse is not true, even though the ITC decides cases much more quickly than the district court. 129 Within the district court, multiple cases on the same patent can be filed within different district courts, and often are, for forum shopping and jurisdictional reasons.
These complexities create incentives for litigants to litigate the same issues in multiple venues. For example, over 90% of ITC patent cases in 2012 had a district court counterpart.
130 PAE cases are routinely filed in multiple districts. 131 The different standards each use invite waste by defendants and plaintiffs, and make it much more likely that cases will be settled for the cost of defense, rather than based on the merits of the case.
One way to decrease the incentives to file in multiple venues is by tightening the interfaces -by staging the various proceedings so that only one at a time is being heard and they bind each other -and reducing the differences between them. In exchange for patent validity challenges at the PTO being brought within a certain period of time after a case is filed, the district court should stay the case, and the PTO should be able to hear the same grounds of validity that are available in the district court. Since this could introduce delays to the plaintiff receiving relief, accelerated review, for a fee paid by the defendant requesting review, could be required. When the ITC hears a case, it should apply the same standard as does the district court to the decision of whether or not to grant an injunction. Expanding the bases for post-grant review and ensuring that PTO challenges result in a stay, and making these efforts have preclusive effect in the district court, but still be appealable, and harmonizing injunctions law between the ITC and district court, 132 would further these aims.
Another source of duplication arises when hundreds of adopters of a technology, rather than the single supplier of the technology, are pursued for patent infringement. Though sometimes there are practical reasons for these suits, they are also happening with increasing frequency because customers are generally unsophisticated and can't count on manufacturers to step in and assume the defense. 133 Absent compelling reasons, the pathways to manufacturers standing behind their products should be removed.
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Get the Patentee and Accused On the Same Page As Quickly as Possible About the Merits of a Case
Holding up and holding out happen because the parties disagree about whether the target needs a license. Among the various assessments that need to be made in order for a court to rule on, some are dispositive and do not require intensive fact discovery. For defendants, these include the availability of defenses like exhaustion and certain grounds of patent invalidity (like patentable subject matter). For plaintiffs, these may include the meaning of a particular claim term, or whether the target knew about the patent. Early determination of these dispositive issues would reduce the risks for both plaintiffs and defendants. 132 Each of these concepts is alluded to in President Obama's legislative recommendations issued on June 4, 2013 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-housetask-force-high-tech-patent-issues (at 3, 5) Given how diametrically opposed the patent hold-up and hold-out perspectives are, what they commonly endorse deserves careful attention. In the spring and fall of 2013, I surveyed 500 in-house, plaintiffs, and general attorneys about their perspectives on various patent reforms. The intervention about which there was the strongest finding and consensus among the three communities was the value of judges deciding early summary judgments motions -over 90% of plaintiff's lawyers, outside counsel, and defendants and defendant/plaintiff lawyers thought that practice would be very or somewhat effective at increasing efficiency in patent adjudication, with 76% of inside counsel in companies, 72% of outside counsel generally, and close to 50% of plaintiff's counsel believing the intervention to be "very effective." 135 In a follow-up discussion of these results, judges said that they would be more inclined to do so if the parties agreed to have all of their SJ motions heard at once, rather than bringing them serially.
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The ITC has taken the lead in early disposition by implementing a pilot program that provides for an early determination within the first 100 days of a case. 137 The program has been praised for reducing costs and narrowing the scope of the hearing, and includes features like staying discovery on all issues other than case-dispositive issues. 138 The district court should follow suit, through legislative or judicial prioritization of cases.
Get the Patentee and Accused On the Same Page As Quickly as Possible About the Value of a Case Through Alternatives to Expert-Driven Damages
Hold up and hold-out also occur because the parties disagree on the value of a patent and have very different reference frames for calculating this value -parties are often loath to provide sensitive financial information about sales, profits or past licenses, for example, until they have to. This disagreement is fueled by non-specialist juries and a flexible legal standard for calculating damages that enables damages experts to come to diametrically opposing opinions about the value of a patent, driving even further apart parties' expectations. Steps should be taken to reduce the gap in expectations between the parties and facilitate earlier dispute resolution.
Patentholders and their targets should know ahead of time what the range of a patent's worth, instead of relying on courts to make the determination. One way to do so 135 Chien, Best Practices, supra note ___. 136 Id. would be to allow parties to give up damages precision in favor of speed: as one prominent alternative solutions provider relayed to me lawmakers should "[f]ocus on speed-business and commerce need certainty and speed-not Georgia Pacific factors after 36 months." Mechanisms that arguably rate low on precision but high on speed and certainty include rate tables 139 mediation, 140 or employing a simplistic formula (for example based on lines of code or total patents on the feature based on a keyword search) for reducing the information and transactions costs associated with patent valuation should be explored. To the extent that other "rules of thumb" are used in real life to determine the value of ex ante licenses, those should be favored. If a patent is only one of a thousand that a product reads on, and is worth less than a cent per unit at best, as has been determined in the case of Microsoft Windows' products practicing Motorola's H.264 patents, 141 and the parties both know that ahead of time, perhaps paying that rate will be a better option than arguing about its enforceability.
Promote Proportionality
Finally, the patent system should provide incentives and ways for cases to be resolved at a cost that is proportional to their value. First, driving up the costs of the other side -via holding up or holding-out -would be penalized, for example, by making two-way fee-shifting the norm and requiring parties to pay beyond core discovery, To proportionally rightsize patent proceedings, options like excluding attorneys, 142 tele-conference based trials, eliminating unnecessary discovery and witnesses, eliminating juries, 143 and capping damages, based on, for example, revenue or cost of component parts, 144 have been suggested by those on both side of the issue 145 and could be offered to litigants as options for pursuing low-cost and efficient relief. The value of the case should be determined based on using defendant's product revenue as a cap. Many litigants would likely give up due process for certainty, and low transaction costs.
PART V: CONCLUSION
There are two sides to every story, and patent enforcement is no exception. But focusing on the problems that fuel both the over enforcement of patents, or patent holdup, and the under enforcement of patents, or patent hold-out -namely the high costs, uncertainty, and duplication that reside in the patent system -both problems can be reduced. Scholars and others have focused for decades on getting patent law right -by having doctrinal debates and engaging in substantive policy-making. But in the meantime, they have created a patent law that no longer works for businesses and others in the innovation ecosystem. The design, as much as the doctrine of patent law, matters; this essay is meant to stimulate further thinking and dialog about it how to improve it.
